Enron Oil and Gas Company v. State of Utah, Department of Natural Resources, Division of State Lands and Forestry and the Director of the Division of State Lands and Forestry : Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1991
Enron Oil and Gas Company v. State of Utah,
Department of Natural Resources, Division of State
Lands and Forestry and the Director of the
Division of State Lands and Forestry : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Steven F. Alder; Assistant Attorney General; John S. McAllister ; Gale K. Francis; Attorney for
Appellees.
Dante L. Zarlengo; A. John Davis; Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtell; Steven P. Williams, the Coastal
Corporation; Phillip Wm. Lear; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation







L i \ lcF 
.511102] No. 910057 IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
ENRON OIL & GAS COMPANY 
(Successor to Belco Petroleum Corporation) 
Appellant, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, 
DIVISION OF STATE LANDS AND FORESTRY AND THE 
DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION OF STATE LANDS 
AND FORESTRY 
Appellees, 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ENRON OIL & GAS COMPANY 
Steven F. Alder 
Assistant Attorney General 
Office of the Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-1017 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES 
John S. McAllister 
Assistant Attorney General 
36 South State St., #1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 533-3220 
Gale K. Francis 
Assistant Attorney General 
36 South State St., #1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 533-3200 
ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE 
TO APPELLEES 
Dante L. Zarlengo 
1801 Broadway, Suite 1600 
Denver, Colorado 80202 
Telephone: (303) 292-9025 
A. John Davis 
Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtell 
1850 Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-8446 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
Steven P. Williams 
The Coastal Corporation 
Nine Greenway Plaza, Suite 880 
Houston, Texas 77046-0995 
Telephone: (713) 877-6838 
Phillip Wm. Lear 
50 South Main St., Ste. 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE 
TO APPELLANT 
Appellate Priority Classification: 16 F I L E D 




FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
ENRON OIL & GAS COMPANY 
(Successor t o Belco Petroleum Corporation) 
Appellant, 
v . 
STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, 
DIVISION OF STATE LANDS AND FORESTRY AND THE 
DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION OF STATE LANDS 
AND FORESTRY 
Appellees, 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ENRON OIL & GAS COMPANY 
Steven F. Alder 
Assistant Attorney General 
Office of the Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-1017 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES 
John S. McAllister 
Assistant Attorney General 
36 South State st., #1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 533-3220 
Gale K. Francis 
Assistant Attorney General 
36 South State St., #1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 533-3200 
ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE 
TO APPELLEES 
Dante L. Zarlengo 
1801 Broadway, Suite 1600 
Denver, Colorado 80202 
Telephone: (303) 292-9025 
A. John Davis 
Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtell 
1850 Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-8446 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
Steven P. Williams 
The Coastal Corporation 
Nine Greenway Plaza, Suite 880 
Houston, Texas 77046-0995 
Telephone: (713) 877-6838 
Phillip Wm. Lear 
50 South Main St,, Ste. 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE 
TO APPELLANT 
Classification: 16 Appellate Priority 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
ARGUMENT 1 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND DEFERENCE ACCORDED 
AGENCY DETERMINATION 1 
A. The standard of review in this case 
is correction of errors 1 
B. Assessment of royalty on tax re-
imbursements is not required by 
the Division's trust responsibili-
ties over State lands 4 
II. THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 65-1-18 
DID NOT REQUIRE THAT ROYALTY BE PAID 
ON PRODUCTION TAX REIMBURSEMENTS 8 
III. THE LEASE LANGUAGE DOES NOT INCLUDE PRODUCTION 
TAX REIMBURSEMENTS AS PART OF ROYALTY VALUE . . . 9 
IV. ASSESSMENT OF ROYALTY ON PRODUCTION TAX REIM-
BURSEMENTS VIOLATES THE PROVISIONS OF THE 
NATURAL GAS POLICY ACT OF 1978 13 
CONCLUSION 16 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Page 
Adkins v. Division of State Lands, 719 P.2d 524 (Utah 1988) . 1 
Arizona State Land Dept. v. R. H. Fulton. Inc.f 
577 P.2d 255 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) 4 
Blair v. Chicago. 201 U.S. 400, 26 S. Ct. 427 (1906) . . . . 5 
BWAB. Inc.. 121 IBLA 188 (1991) 11 
Coleman v. Utah State Land Board. 403 P.2d 781 
(Utah 1965) 5 
Enron Oil & Gas Co. v. Luian. 778 F. Supp. 348 
(S.D. Tex. 1991) 9 
Hoover & Bracken Energies, Inc. v. United States. 3 
723 F.2d 1488 (10th Cir. 1983) 
Hurley v. Board of Review of Indus. Corom'n.. 
767 P. 2d 524 (Utah 1988) 1 
Lassen v. Arizona. 385 U.S. 458 (1967) 4 
McKniaht v. State Land Board. 381 P.2d 726 (Utah 1963) . . . 2 
Morton Int'l.. Inc. v. Auditing Division of the 
Utah State Tax Comm. . 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991) 1 
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Peterson. 218 F.2d 926 
(10th Cir. 1954) 15 
Plateau Mining v. Utah Div. of State Lands and 
Forestry. 802 P.2d 720 (Utah 1990) 5 
State ex rel. Commissioner of Land Office 
v. Butler. 753 P.2d 1334 (Okla. 1987) 6 
State of Utah v. Andrus. 486 F. Supp. 995 (Utah 1979) . . . . 5 
State v. Moncrief. 720 P.2d 470 (Wyo. 1986) 7 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT'D.1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES & RULES 
Page 
Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 15 U.S.C. § 3301, et seq., . . 13 
15 U.S.C. S 3320 13 
30 C.F.R. § 206.103 (1987) 14 




I. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND DEFERENCE ACCORDED 
AGENCY DETERMINATION. 
A. The Standard of Review in this Case is 
Correction of Errors. 
As pointed out by Appellant Enron Oil & Gas Company ("Enron") 
in its Brief, the standard of review in this case is one of 
correction of errors. Appellant's Brief at 2. This Court must 
determine if the Division of State Land and Forestry's position in 
this case is correct as a matter of law. Adkins v. Division of 
State Lands, 719 P.2d 524 (Utah 1986), which established this 
standard, is directly on point. Adkins also involved 
interpretation of the provisions of the Utah statute dealing with 
issuance of oil and gas leases on State lands. It held that when 
a correction of errors standard is applied, no deference is due the 
agency's interpretation of the statutes and lease provisions. See 
also, Hurley v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n., 767 P.2d 524 
(Utah 1988), and cases cited therein. 
Yet Appellees State of Utah, Department of Natural Resources, 
Division of State Lands and Forestry, and the Director of the 
Division of State Lands and Forestry (the "Division") and Amicus 
Curiae Board of Education insist that deference is due the position 
set forth by the Division. However, authorities relied upon by the 
Division and by the Board of Education do not support such a 
conelusion. Morton Int'n., Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah 
State Tax Comm'n., 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991), cited by the Division, 
1 
was decided under the provisions of the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act, which is not applicable in this case. See 
Appellant's Brief at 2, n.l. In fact, in Morton, this Court 
clearly stated that in cases such as this where only issues of law 
exist, and there are no undisputed facts and agency discretion is 
not an issue, the correction of errors standard is applicable. 
The Court should further note that, contrary to the 
contentions of the Division, the facts and issue in this case are 
straightforward and their resolution is determined solely by 
interpretation of applicable statutory provisions and lease terms, 
for which agency expertise is irrelevant or unnecessary. The 
Division also cites McKniaht v. State Land Board, 381 P.2d 726 
(Utah 1963) for the proposition that the agency is due deference. 
Appellees1 Brief at 2. However, in McKniaht the issue before the 
Court was whether or not regulations issued by the State Land Board 
were inconsistent with the applicable statutory terms. While an 
agency's interpretation of its own regulations may be entitled to 
deference, no such regulations exist here and the applicability of 
agency regulations is not before* the Court. More importantly, 
McKniaht involved the agency's discretion in determining priority 
of applications for oil and gas leases on public lands. Agency 
discretion is not involved here. Rather, as in Adkins, the issue 
here turns upon interpretation of the applicable lease terms, which 
determine the rights and responsibilities of both the Division and 
Enron, as to payment of royalty. Under these circumstances, no 
deference is afforded the interpretation given by the Division. 
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This rule is in direct contrast to the standard of review in 
the case of Hoover & Bracken Energies, Inc. v. DPI. 723 F.2d 1488 
(10th Cir. 1983), and the other cases interpreting federal leases, 
which are relied upon by the Division and by the Utah State Tax 
Commission ("Tax Commissionff) . In that case, the standard of 
review is stated as follows: 
Indeed, when an agency is interpreting its own regula-
tions, the courts have given added deference to the 
agencyfs construction. The standard of review for an 
administrative agency1s interpretation of its own 
regulation is that of a plainly erroneous or inconsistent 
standard. 
723 F.2d 1488, 1489. 
Under a correction of errors standard, as opposed to a plainly 
erroneous standard, no deference is due an agency determination. 
And, for that reason alone, a different result is required here 
than was reached in Hoover & Bracken. Applying a "plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent" standard, and granting agency deference, 
the Court found that tax reimbursements are part of "gross 
proceeds" for royalty purposes on federal leases. Applying a 
correction of errors standard here, with no deference due the 
agency's construction, and where the Court is free to make its own 
determination on the merits of the issue without the constraint of 
a "plainly erroneous" standard, a different result is required. 
In any event, the Secretary of the Interior is given broad 
discretion to implement the terms of the Minerals Lands Leasing Act 
of 1920, under which the Hoover & Bracken decision arose, 30 U.S.C. 
§ 189. No such statutory discretion is vested in the Division by 
the Utah leasing act and the Court is again able to substitute its 
3 
own judgment for that of the Division if required by the statutory 
and lease terms. 
B. Assessment of Royalty on Tax Reimburse-
ments is not Required by the Division's 
Trust Responsibilities over State Lands. 
The Division and the Board of Education argue that royalty 
must be due on Enron's production tax reimbursements because to 
rule otherwise would violate the trust relationship that exists 
between the Division and the public concerning administration of 
public lands. The Division argues that this relationship requires 
that the lease and statutory terms must be construed in favor of 
the Division. However, neither the Division nor the Board of 
Education suggest a reason why Enron's interpretation of the 
statutory and lease terms is in conflict with the Division's 
responsibilities as to State lands. There is no evidence to 
support or even suggest the notion that Enron's leases were issued 
for less than fair value, that the terms are any less favorable 
than might otherwise be appropriate, or that not collecting royalty 
on tax reimbursements renders a less than fair consideration to the 
State. See Arizona State Land Dept. v. R. H. Fulton, Inc., 577 
P.2d 255 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978). Absence of assessment of royalty, 
where there is no basis for collection of royalty, can hardly be 
considered a violation of a trust duty. There is no allegation 
that issuance of Enron's leases violated any covenant or 
prescription given by the United States in its grant of State land. 
See Lassen v. Arizona, 385 U.S. 458. Further, it is axiomatic that 
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the State cannot impose greater rights upon itself nor obligations 
on its lessees than would be applicable between private parties. 
Assignment of rights in public property accepted by a private party 
amounts to a contract entitled to the protection against impairment 
of contracts by the State. Blair v. Chicago, 201 U.S. 400, 26 S. 
Ct. 427 (1906). 
The cases cited by the Division and the Department of 
Education do not bear on the issue of royalty payable to the 
Division. Plateau Mining v. Utah Division of State Lands and 
Forestry, 802 P.2d 720 (Utah 1990) involved issues as to the 
applicability of the doctrines of laches and estoppel against the 
state in collecting royalty. The Court held that these doctrines 
are not applicable against the state because the state's actions or 
inactions cannot be in contradiction of its trust responsibilities 
over public lands. These issues are not, however, involved in this 
case. Similarly, State of Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995 (D. 
Utah 1979) concerned access to state lands which is also irrelevant 
to this dispute. Coleman v. Utah State Land Board, 403 P.2d 781 
(Utah 1965) dealt with interpretation of an unclear statute in the 
context of determining when lands were available for leasing, and 
the Court in effect used the Statefs trust responsibility as a tool 
to interpret the statute. Here, the lease terms are applicable and 
essentially define Enronfs royalty obligations. Furthermore, the 
applicable statutory and lease terms are unambiguous, and no 
reference need be made to rules of construction. The other cases 
cited by the Division and the Department of Education were likewise 
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based upon different and distinguishing facts, circumstances and 
issues. The fact that the State's trust responsibilities may 
preclude the application of estoppel or laches against it, might 
ensure it access to state lands, or might aid in interpreting 
unclear statutory provisions, does not justify altering the 
unambiguous meaning of the statutory and lease terms at issue 
before this Court. 
That the State's trust responsibilities cannot alter the basic 
relationship between the Division and Enron, was adopted in State 
ex rel. Commissioner of Land Office v. Butler. 753 P.2d 1334 (Okla. 
1987). In that case, the issue before the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
was whether or not reservation of "oil, gas and other minerals" in 
a state patent on school trust lands included coal. The Court 
found that the terms "oil, gas and other minerals" did not include 
coal, and that title to the coal had passed to the patentee. The 
Court rejected the argument submitted by the State that, even 
though the terms of the patent might indicate otherwise, the school 
trust lands doctrine required a result in favor of the State. The 
Court distinguished Lassen, supra, 385 U.S. 458, on the grounds 
that the issuance of the patent was made for full value of the land 
conveyed. The Court further stated: 
Appellants1 argument would mean that every time a new 
mineral was discovered on subject lands, appellants could 
argue in retrospect that at the time of sale it did not 
receive full compensation. We reject the argument and 
find the notion contrary to the language and spirit of 
the Enabling Act, the Oklahoma Constitution, and common 
sense. 
State ex rel Commissioner of Land Office, 758 P.2d at 1339. 
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The same reasoning applies here. If the Division were to succeed 
in this case based upon its arguments concerning the school trust 
relationship, then the Division may assess additional royalty 
against lessees on any theory it might devise, whether or not 
substantiated by the lease terms, and need only demonstrate that 
the State would get more money or needs more money to validate its 
claim. This result is not equitable and is contrary to law. 
Nevertheless, the Division and the Board of Education in 
effect argue, without support, that the applicable statutes and 
lease terms should somehow be modified to allow the Division to 
collect royalty when no royalty would otherwise be due. The 
Wyoming Supreme Court addressed this issue in State v. Moncrief, 
720 P.2d 470 (Wyo. 1986). That case also involved assessment of 
royalty under oil and gas leases covering public trust lands in 
that state. The Wyoming Supreme Court stated in relevant part as 
follows: 
The district court concluded that the effect of the 
provisions of the leases is dictated by their terms and 
the intention of the parties as determined by applicable 
contract law and that the trust agreement could not force 
an inconsistent interpretation. We find that the 
language of the leases is unambiguous and must control. 
Id. at 475. 
Here, also, there is no ambiguity in the statutory or lease 
terms. They require that the royalty reserved by the State in its 
oil and gas leases represents a separate and distinct share of gas 
at the wellhead, and must be valued as such. The State pays no 
tax, and under Enron's natural gas purchase agreements, no tax 
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reimbursement is applicable to the Division's interest. Neither 
the trust relationship that exists over state lands, nor apparent 
financial constraints of the Utah School System, can change that 
reality. 
II. THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 65-18-1 
DID NOT REQUIRE THAT ROYALTY BE PAID ON 
PRODUCTION TAX REIMBURSEMENTS. 
The Division and the Tax Commission argue that "gross value" 
necessarily includes tax reimbursements which Enron's purchasers, 
Colorado Interstate Gas Company and Mountain Fuel Supply Company, 
were willing to pay Enron under the terms of their respective 
natural gas purchase agreements with Enron. In this, the Division 
and the Tax Commission have missed the point. Enron has 
established, and the Division concedes, that Enron1s working 
interest share of production is separate and distinct from that of 
the lessor, the Division. Appelleefs Brief at 6 J 1. Yet both the 
Division^ and the Tax Commission have failed to recognize that it is 
the State's tax exempt, royalty share of production that is subject 
to valuation, not Enron's working interest share. A good faith 
purchaser obviously did not agree to pay a tax reimbursement as to 
gas attributable to a tax free interest, and to assume that a 
purchaser would pay a higher price or substitute other 
consideration for a tax reimbursement is raw speculation. And, as 
noted in Enron's Brief, Appellant's Brief at 17-18, Enron's natural 
gas purchase agreements do not provide for payment of tax 
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reimbursements for a tax exempt interest. See Appellant's Brief 
Addendum E; Record at 73-75; Appellant's Brief Addendum D, Record 
at 73-75. 
Authorities relied upon by the Division do not require a 
contrary conclusion. The cases cited are decisions of the Interior 
Board of Land Appeals, an adjudicative tribunal of the Department 
of the Interior. These cases are not binding precedent upon this 
Court. In fact, they represent nothing more than the Department of 
the Interior's position on this issue, which, not surprisingly, 
requires that royalty be paid on tax reimbursements. The only 
Court decision cited, Enron Oil & Gas Co. v. Luian. 778 F. 
Supp. 348 (S.D. Tex. 1991) is on appeal to the 5th Circuit Court of 
Appeals at this time. 
Finally, the Division and Amici have failed to address the 
critical issue in this case, that the Division pays no tax on its 
interest. The Division and the Amici have shown no real reason why 
the Division should receive royalty on a tax reimbursement. The 
simple fact is that the Division's royalty gas is tax free, and 
must be valued as such, and tax reimbursements are totally 
unrelated to value for royalty purposes. 
III. THE LEASE LANGUAGE DOES NOT INCLUDE PRODUCTION TAX 
REIMBURSEMENTS AS PART OF THE VALUE FOR ROYALTY 
PURPOSES 
Enron has argued that the terms of the oil and gas leases 
subject to this dispute require that royalty value be determined 
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based upon the terms of the applicable natural gas purchase 
agreements. These agreements provide that tax reimbursements are 
not consideration paid for the delivery of gas and are not subject 
to royalty. The Division responds that three (3) alternatives are 
set forth in the leases for determining royalty, and that each 
results in a payment of royalty on tax reimbursements. However, 
the language contained in the royalty clause of these leases does 
not support the Division's position. 
The Division asserts that the first and second alternatives 
provided for calculating royalty are the market value of production 
at the well and market value based upon an approved contract price. 
The Division ignores the fact that the lease royalty clause further 
states: 
Where gas is sold under a contract, and such contract has 
been approved in whole or conditionally by the Lessor, 
the reasonable market value of such gas for the purpose 
of determining royalties hereunder shall be the price at 
which the production is sold... (emphasis added). 
Footnote 5 Appellant's Brief page 7, Attachment C. 
Where a gas purchase agreement exists, and has been approved 
by the Division, the gas purchase agreement defines reasonable 
market value. In this case, Enron's agreements were arguably 
approved by the Division, and the Division concedes that purchase 
contracts are clear evidence of market value. (Br. of Appellee, 
page 13). So the Division's first and second alternatives are 
illusory. The applicable agreements determine market value and, 
therefore, royalty value. Enron has established that these 
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agreements do not allow for tax reimbursements to be paid on the 
Divis ion's tax free royalty interest , and spec i f i ca l ly provide that 
a tax reimbursement i s not a payment for production, and therefore 
subject to royalty. 
In th i s respect, the Tax Commission argues that the tax 
reimbursement provisions of Enron's agreements represent an element 
of value of production, and are as such a portion of the 
consideration received and paid for gas. These bald assertions are 
made without reference to the contractual provisions which, as 
Enron has established, are quite to the contrary. Furthermore, the 
Tax Commission's reference to issues involved in co l lect ion of 
occupation and conservation tax on production tax reimbursements 
are not only wholly irrelevant, but misleading. Enron and the 
Division have entered into o i l and gas leases between them which 
delineate the re lat ive rights and respons ib i l i t i e s of the part ies . 
These terms cannot be modified by the posit ions assumed by the Tax 
Commission re lat ive to occupation and conservation tax, nor by the 
actions of the Commission concerning tax reimbursements.1 
The i s s u e i d e n t i f i e d by the Tax Commission, Appel lees ' Brief at 12, that 
assessment of occupation tax on tax reimbursements would r e s u l t in a never-ending 
sp i ra l of payments i s not present in t h i s case , because Enron's gas purchase 
agreements do not allow for reimbursement of addit ional royal ty assessments based 
upon tax reimbursements, as they allow for reimbursement of addit ional taxes that 
might be assessed on that theory. However, the Court should note that i f the Tax 
Commission preva i l s on t h i s i s s u e , and the D i v i s i o n ' s p o s i t i o n i s upheld in t h i s 
case , the Div i s ion could seek addit ional royalty i f an addit ional tax i s assessed 
based upon a tax reimbursement. See BWAB, I n c . . 121 IBLA 188 (1991). This 
r e s u l t i s completely foreign t o the s tatutory and l ease terms and requires no 
further d i scuss ion . 
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The Division argues that a third proviso exists under the 
terms of the lease concerning royalty value, the federal royalty 
provision, and that, "This provision has the effect of placing a 
floor on the royalty the State is to receive that is at least as 
much as the federal government receives." Appellee's Br. page 13. 
Again, the Division fails to addr€*ss the entire lease provision. 
It states in relevant part: 
...the reasonable market value of such gas for the 
purpose of determining royalties payable hereunder shall 
be the price at which production is sold, provided that 
in no event shall the price for gas be less than that 
received by the United States of America for its 
royalties from gas of like grade and quality from the 
same field. 
Appellant's Br., footnote 5, page 7, Attachment C. 
This provision does not require that the Division receive the 
same royalty as the federal government, only that the price 
received under Enron's gas purchase agreements for production 
allocated to the State's interest be the same as the price received 
for production allocated to the federal government which, in this 
case, it was. As pointed out by Enron in its Brief, the federal 
government's leases in the Chapita Wells and Natural Buttes Units 
have been committed to the same gas purchase agreements as the 
State's leases. See transcript at 11; Record at 185. Thus, the 
Division's third alternative simply is not applicable in this case. 
In any event, as also pointed out by Enron in its Brief 
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(Appellantfs Br. page 22), and contrary to the assertions of the 
Division, the status of royalty on tax reimbursement under United 
States oil and gas lease is, and continues to be, subject to 
question. 
IV. ASSESSMENT OF ROYALTY ON PRODUCTION TAX 
REIMBURSEMENTS VIOLATES THE PROVISIONS OF THE 
NATURAL GAS POLICY ACT OF 1978. 
Enron has argued that the position of the Division, adopted by 
the District Court, establishes a royalty value under State of Utah 
leases higher than the maximum lawful price specified under the 
Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 ("NGPA"). 15 U.S.C. S 3301 et seq. 
During the years at issue, Enron sold its gas for the maximum 
lawful price permitted by law, and paid royalty to the Division on 
that basis. Section 110 of the NGPA provides that a tax 
reimbursement will not cause the price paid and received to exceed 
the maximum lawful price, provided that the tax is borne by the 
selling party. 15 U.S.C. § 3320. Therefore, a party not paying a 
tax may not receive a tax reimbursement in addition to the maximum 
lawful price paid for its gas. Yet, this is precisely what the 
Division seeks to accomplish, to establish a royalty value which 
includes tax reimbursements in addition to the maximum lawful 
price. Thus, the royalty value so established by the Division and 
approved by the District Court, is higher than the price which a 
willing seller and a willing buyer could ever negotiate or 
exchange. Neither the Division nor the Tax Commission directly 
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address this issue nor justify this conclusion. In fact, no such 
justification exists. 
The Division again draws the Courtfs attention to Interior 
Board of Land Appeals decisions which only represent the position 
of the Department of the Interior, are not binding on this Court, 
or even instructive as to the issue. Only two court cases are 
cited, Enron Oil & Gas Co. v. Luian. 775 F. Supp. 348 which, as 
mentioned above, is on appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, and Hoover & Bracken, Inc., 723 F.2d 1488. Each of these 
cases is distinguishable from this case. 
Under the federal rules in effect during the time period at 
issue in this case, royalty was calculated based upon royalty value 
not to be less than "the gross proceeds accruing to the lessee" 
from the sale of production. 30 C.F.R. § 206.103 (1987). See 
Hoover & Bracken Indust., Inc., 723 F.2d at 1490. Here, royalty 
value is established as the price paid under Enron's natural gas 
purchase agreements. These terms are more specific and 
significantly more narrow in scope. That production tax 
reimbursements may be considered part of the "gross proceeds" 
accruing to a lessee from the sale of gas, does not mean that they 
are also part of the price for which production is sold as 
established under the applicable natural gas purchase agreements. 
In fact, Enron has established that tax reimbursements are not part 
of the market value of natural gas under the terms of its natural 
gas purchase agreements. 
14 
Most importantly, in Hoover & Bracken, the federal lease at 
issue had been communitized or combined with private land to form 
a drilling unit. The Court determined that in that instance, the 
government's royalty share of production became effectively 
commingled with the royalty of private owners, which was subject to 
tax, and therefore lost its tax free characteristics. The Court 
explained as follows: 
The District Court considers it unlawful to value the 
production above the ceiling price when the gas 
attributable to the federal and Indian lands was not 
subject to any state severance tax. This fails to 
consider the dispositive fact that the lands at issue are 
communitized.... 
The general rule for royalty payments when a 
communitization agreement is in effect is that the 
"lessors of land participating in a unit agreement share 
in royalties from the unit based upon the number of acres 
committed to them by the unit." 
723 F.2d 1488, 1492 (emphasis added). 
The leases involved in that case covered lands in Oklahoma, 
and a different result is required under Utah law. Specifically, 
it has been long ago established that unitization or 
communitization does not constitute a cross conveyance of interest, 
and that, unlike the Court's holding in Hoover & Bracken. each 
lease and the applicable royalty interest associated with it, 
maintains its own, distinctive legal characteristics. Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Peterson. 218 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1954). Thus, 
under Utah law, the Division's royalty gas maintains its 
distinctive characteristic as a share of production not subject to 
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tax, and the NGPA limitation on receipt of tax reimbursements in 
addition to the maximum lawful price by parties not paying a tax is 
directly applicable. 
V. CONCLUSION. 
The Division and the Tax Commission have failed to address the 
real issues in this case, and instead choose to rely upon 
authorities with little or no precedential value. However, this is 
clearly an issue of first impression, one this Court must determine 
based upon Utah law and the terms of the oil and gas lease issued 
by the Division to Enron's predecessors, applying a correction of 
errors standard. Although the Division has failed to do so, this 
Court should direct its attention to the fact that (1) the 
Division's royalty gas is separate and distinct from Enron's share 
of gas, and must be valued as such, (2) tax reimbursements are 
inapplicable, both practically and under Enron's gas purchase 
agreements, to the Division's royalty gas, and (3) the Division's 
position results in royalty value in excess of the maximum lawful 
price specified under the NGPA, a value higher than what a willing 
seller and willing buyer could ever negotiate for the sale of its 
gas. Based upon this analysis, the inevitable conclusion is that 
royalty is not due the Division on Enron's production tax 
reimbursements. 
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For the reasons stated, it is respectfully requested that the 
District Court's ruling be reversed. 
Dated this /5 day of June, 1992. 
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